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Why do so few women serve as judges? Why has the torrent of wom-
en's entry into the legal profession not produced a pipeline to power for 
women in the judicial branch of government? What will it take to move 
women from minority to parity? Answering these questions provides an 
excellent vehicle for exploring concepts in gender theory such as the myth 
that women have already achieved equality or are making great progress, 
the qualified labor pool, disparate impact, the pipeline, the pyramid, token-
ism, backlash, and the difference women make-all of which are important 
to understand the underrepresentation of women more generally. Judge-
ships, like executive offices, may be more difficult for women to attain, as 
voters may be more comfortable including a woman in legislative delibera-
tions of a group rather than making her commander-in-chief. The exercise 
of judicial power is enmeshed in powerful cultural norms of masculinity. It 
is no accident that women's exclusion from juries was one of the last sex-
based classifications the U.S. Supreme Court declared to be unconstitution-
al. 
In the summers of 2009 and 2010, the nominations and confirmations 
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan rekin-
dled public discussion about the gender and ethnic identities of judges and 
senators. In their opening statements at Sotomayor's confirmation hearings, 
for example, senators burst with pride about a great country where anyone 
can achieve anything, regardless of gender, class, ethnicity, or national 
origin, while some equated empathy with prejudice and difference with par-
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tiality. 1 Despite the vitriol opposition directed at Sotomayor, the Senate con-
firmed her by a vote of 68-31 and Kagan by a vote of 63-37.2 In the end, 
both hearings squelched rather than explored the questions of what feminist 
legal theorist Martha Minow has so aptly named "the dilemma of differ-
ence"-bow women can be both equal to and different from men3-and the 
nature of judging-bow one's social location and life experiences inevitably 
shape judgment.4 The dullness of the Sotomayor bearings stood in sharp 
contrast to the euphoria in the Latino community, where many sported the 
latest fashion: t-shirts emblazoned with "Wise Latina Woman," which dis-
pelled any doubt about the symbolic importance of such appointments.5 
INTRODUCTION: KEY CONCEPTS 
Progress toward women's equality is not quick, steady, or irreversible, 
and the bumpy road to women's equality in the judiciary is no exception. It 
took the women's movement seventy-two years to win the vote for women 
after the Women's Rights Convention in Seneca Falls in 1848 first placed 
I. The Women's Media Center drew the parallel between how opponents and 
media critics treated Hillary Clinton during her presidential campaign and the campaign 
against Judge Sotomayor. See Media Justice for Sotomayor, WOMEN'S MEDIA CENTER (July 
10, 2009), http://www.womensmediacenter.com/b1og/entry/media-justice-for-sotomayor; see 
also Campaign Update: Sexism Sells but We're Not Buying It, WOMEN'S MEDIA CENTER 
(July 25, 2008), http://www.womensmediacenter.com/blog/2008/05/sexism-might-sell-but-
were-not-buying-it (highlighting the media's treatment of Hillary); Susan J. Carroll, Reflec-
tions on Gender and Hillary Clinton's Presidential Campaign: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Misogynic, 5 POL. & GENDER I (2009); Nancy Bums, Comparison and Intersection, 5 PoL. 
& GENDER 69 (2009); Jennifer L. Lawless, Sexism and Gender Bias in Election 2008: A 
More Complex Path for Women in Politics, 5 PoL. & GENDER 70 (2009); Leonie Huddy & 
Tony E. Carey, Group Politics Redux: Race and Gender in the 2008 Democratic Presiden-
tial Primaries, 5 POL. & GENDER 81 (2009); Ange-Marie Hancock, An Untraditional Inter-
sectional Analysis of the 2008 Election, 5 POL. & GENDER 96 (2009); Jane Junn, Making 
Room for Women of Color: Race and Gender Categories in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Elec-
tion, 5 POL. & GENDER I 05 (2009). 
2. Stuart Taylor Jr., Kagan's Hearings Are All About the Midterms, NEWSWEEK 
(June 30, 20 I 0), http://www.newsweek.com/20 I 0/06/30/kagan-hearings-are-all-about-the-
midterms.html; Carl Hulse, Senate Confirms Kagan in Partisan Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 
201 0), http://www.nytimes.com/20 I 0/08/06/us/politics/06kagan.html? _r=O. 
3. Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 10-95 
(1987). 
4. Nancy Maveety, Difference in Judicial Discourse, 6 POL. & GENDER 452, 457 
(2010). 
5. Mireya Navarro, Sotomayor Fans Claim the Phrase "Wise Latina," N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/fashion/091atina.html?_r=O. 
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that demand on the public agenda.6 Although Iowa's Attorney General ruled 
that her sex was not an obstacle to the Iowa Bar Association admitting Belle 
Babb Mansfield in 1869/ most courts worldwide interpreted laws and regu-
lations on membership of the legal profession as excluding women.8 Wom-
en were neither persons nor sufficiently autonomous from husbands to prac-
tice law, the courts opined,9 and women had to petition their legislatures for 
admission state by state and province by province. 10 Florence Allen won 
election to the Common Pleas Court of Ohio in 1920 and was the first 
woman to serve on a general jurisdiction court in the United States. 11 In 
1922, she won election to the Ohio Supreme Court (the first woman on any 
state supreme court), and in 1934, President Roosevelt appointed her to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where she served until 1959. 12 
She was the first woman whom presidents could credibly consider for Su-
preme Court vacancies, and women campaigned hard each of the twelve 
6. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Seneca Falls Keynote Address (July 19, 1948), availa-
ble at http://www.greatamericandocuments.com/speeches/stanton-seneca-falls.html; U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIX. 
7. KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN 
AMERICA 1638 TO THE PRESENT II (1986); see also Cheryl Mullenbach, The Election of Julia 
Addington: An Accidental Milestone in Iowa Politics, IOWA HERITAGE ILLUSTRATED, Fall 
2007, at 112, available at http://www.las.iastate.edu/cattcenter/wp-content/uploads/Julia 
_ Addington.pdf. 
8. He heretofore had always been inclusive for purposes of criminal law or taxa-
tion, LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE 
0BLIGA TIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 81-123 (I 998) (discussing taxation and the right to vote), most 
notoriously in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 140-41 
(1872). 
9. ALBIE SACHS & JOAN HOFF WILSON, SEXISM AND THE LAW: A STUDY OF MALE 
BELIEFS AND LEGAL BIAS IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 137-38 (1978). 
10. See MARY JANE MOSSMAN, THE FIRST WOMEN LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF GENDER, LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS 24 (2006). 
II. See FLORENCE ELLINWOOD ALLEN, To Do JUSTLY 63-64 (1965); Larry Berkson, 
Women on the Bench: A Brief History, 65 JUDICATURE 286, 291 (1982); Beverly Blair Cook, 
Florence Ellinwood Allen, in NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN: THE MODERN PERIOD--A 
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY II, 11-13 (Barbara Sicherman et al. eds., 1980) [hereinafter 
Cook, Florence Ellinwood Allen]; Beverly B. Cook, Women as Supreme Court Candidates: 
From Florence Allen to Sandra 0 'Connor, 65 JUDICATURE 314, 319 (1982) [hereinafter 
Cook, Supreme Court Candidates]; Sally J. Kenney, "It Would Be Stupendous for Us Girls": 
Campaigning for Women Judges Without Waiving, in BREAKING THE WAVE: WOMEN, THEIR 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND FEMINISM, 1945-1985, at 209, 211-12 (Kathleen A. Laughlin & 
Jacqueline Castledine eds., 2011); JOAN ELLEN ORGAN, SEXUALITY AS A CATEGORY OF 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS: A STUDY OF JUDGE FLORENCE E. ALLEN, 1884-1996, at 2-3 (1998); 
JEANETTE E. TUVE, FIRST LADY OF THE LAW: FLORENCE ELLINWOOD ALLEN 56 (1984). For a 
list of all notable judicial firsts, see MART MARTIN, THE ALMANAC OF WOMEN AND 
MINORITIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 115-17 ( 1999). 
12. Kenney, supra note 11, at 211-12. 
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times a seat became open before she retired. 13 Her sexual orientation may 
have been a contributing factor to presidents overlooking her. 
Not until 1981 did President Reagan appoint Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor as the first woman to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court. Because 
women have increased their numbers among law school graduates during 
the last thirty years and because women have made substantial inroads into 
the legal profession, we tend to think that the number of women judges is 
going steadily upward, but that is not the case. President Clinton appointed 
the largest number of women to date and the largest percentage of women to 
the bench of any president, 28%. 14 But progress has not been steady. Fol-
lowing President Clinton, only slightly more than 22% of the judges Presi-
dent George W. Bush appointed were women. 15 South Dakota was the last 
state to appoint its first woman to its supreme court in 2002, but three states 
that had women serving on their state supreme courts went back to all-male: 
Indiana, Idaho, and Iowa. 16 In fact, at least forty-eight states have reversed 
their progress, each going from one woman on its supreme court (like Indi-
ana, Idaho, and Iowa) to none, or from a majority of women to a minority 
(such as Minnesota), or not replacing a woman who leaves with another 
woman. 17 "[W]omen make up ... 22% of all federal judgeships and 26% of 
all state-level positions."18 Only eight states have achieved a 33% threshold 
or more, but in fourteen states, women fill less than 20% of the positions. 19 
We cannot take women's steady progress for granted, nor assume it is irre-
versible. 
A number of important concepts from employment discrimination can 
help us think about women's progress on the bench, such as the qualified 
labor pool. An important part of the analysis of a claim of sex discrimina-
tion is to compare the composition of the qualified labor pool to the num-
13. Cook, Supreme Court Candidates, supra note II, at 323-24. 
14. Elaine Martin, Gender and Presidential Judicial Selection, 26 WOMEN & POL., 
no. 3-4,2004 at 109, 117-18. 
15. Jennifer Segal Diascro & Rorie Spill Solberg. George W. Bush's Legacy on the 
Federal Bench: Policy in the Face of Diversity, 92 JUDICATURE 289,291 (2009). 
16. Sally J. Kenney & Jason Windett, Diffusion of Innovation or State Political 
Culture? Explaining the First Women State Supreme Court Justices 2 (2012), available at 
http://20 12sppconference.blogs.rice.edu/files/20 12/02/Kenney _ Windett _ SPPC _Draft. pdf. 
Loretta Rush took her seat as the second woman on the Indiana Supreme Court in September 
of 2012. First Woman Named to Indiana Supreme Court since 1999, WTHR.COM (Sep. 14 
2012, I 0:29 AM), http://www. wthr.com/story/19543665/daniels-set-to-name-new-ind-
supreme-court-justice. 
17. SALLY J. KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY 
REALLY MATTER 147 (2013). 
18. CTR. FOR WOMEN IN GOV'T & CIVIL SOC'Y, WOMEN IN FEDERAL AND STATE-
LEVEL JUDGESHIPS (2010), available at www.albany.edu/womeningov/judgeships_report_ 
final_ web. pdf. 
19. /d. 
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bers of women employers hire.20 If women make up 50% of law school 
graduates, but only I 0% of the lawyers law firms hire are women, we sus-
pect something about the selection procedures or criteria works to women's 
disadvantage. The onus is thus on the employer to show the relevance of its 
selection criteria and that its hiring process is free of bias. The same analy-
sis applies to women judges. If the process for choosing judges was fair and 
did not discriminate against women, we would expect the proportion of 
women judges to be close to the proportion of women lawyers with the re-
quired number of years of practice. When political scientist Beverly Blair 
Cook first investigated, however, she found that between 1920 and 1970, 
states varied as to whether 1% or 5% of lawyers were women and 1% to 
10% of trial court judges were women.21 By 1984, as the number ofwomen 
lawyers grew, a wider gap emerged.22 This left Cook to reject the "trickle up 
hypothesis," which was that women would ascend to the bench proportion-
ate to their numbers in the legal profession with the passage of time.23 Cook 
found a 50% disparity between the numbers of women judges we might 
expect based on the number of women lawyers. 24 If women were 10% of the 
lawyers in a state, about 5% of judges would be women.25 Scholars contin-
ued to investigate the relationship between the proportion of women law-
yers and the proportion of women judges and found little relationship be-
tween the two. 26 Nor did the number of women trial judges predict the num-
ber of women appellate judges.27 To conclude, we cannot explain women's 
20. SALLY J. KENNEY, FOR WHOSE PROTECTION? REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS AND 
EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN 67 ( 1992). 
21. Beverly Blair Cook, Women Judges: The End of Tokenism, in WOMEN IN THE 
COURTS 84, 84-105 (Winifred L. Hepperle & Laura Crites eds., 1978). 
22. Beverly Blair Cook, Women Judges: A Preface to Their History, 14 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 573, 576 n.7 (1984). 
23. !d. at 574-75. 
24. See id. at 576 n.7. 
25. Beverly B. Cook, Women on the State Bench: Correlates of Access, in 
POLITICAL WOMEN: CURRENT ROLES IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 191, 199 (Janet A. 
Flammang ed., 1984). 
26. See, e.g., Nicholas 0. Alozie, Selection Methods and the Recruitment of Women 
to State Courts of Last Resort, 77 Soc. Sci. Q. 110, 122 (1996); Rorie L. Spill & Kathleen A. 
Bratton, Clinton and Diversification of the Federal Judiciary, 84 JUDICATURE 256, 256-57 
(2001); MarkS. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differen-
tial Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate Courts, 
3 ST. POL. & PoL'Y Q. 329, 342 (2003); Martin, supra note 14, at 113; Elaine Martin & Barry 
Pyle, Gender and Racial Diversification of State Supreme Courts, 24 WOMEN & POL., no. 2, 
2002 at 35, 39; MALIA REDDICK, MICHAEL J. NELSON & RACHEL PAINE CAUFIELD, 
EXAMINING DIVERSITY ON STATE COURTS: HOW DOES THE JUDICIAL SELECTION 
ENVIRONMENT ADVANCE-AND INHIBIT-JUDICIAL DIVERSITY? 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Examining_Diversity _on_ State_ Courts_ 
2CA4D9DF458DD.pdf. 
27. See Spill & Bratton, supra note 26, at 257; Margaret Williams, Women's Repre-
sentation on State Trial and Appellate Courts, 88 Soc. SCI. Q. 1192, 1200 (2007). 
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underrepresentation on courts simply as a result of the absence of women in 
the qualified labor pool, nor can we assume that the numbers of women 
judges will grow naturally or inevitably as the number of women lawyers 
grows. Moreover, the huge variation among states in how long it took after 
the admission of women to the state bar for a state to appoint its first woman 
to the state supreme court, 28 as well as the large differences among states as 
to when they named their first woman supreme court justice, 29 suggest that 
something other than simply the number of women lawyers is at work. 
Employment discrimination analysis uses two categories, disparate 
impact and disparate treatment. Using different standards for choosing men 
and women judges, what we call a double standard, constitutes disparate 
treatment discrimination-the most blatant form of discrimination other 
than excluding women from consideration altogether. Political scientist 
Elaine Martin documented how the American Bar Association's (ABA) 
Committee on the Federal Judiciary, which rates nominees, employed a 
double standard, rating women but not men lower if they had not been judg-
es.30 Disparate impact discrimination occurs when employers use a facially 
neutral requirement or condition-for example, that one must have had pre-
vious judicial experience-as a criterion.31 Employers can justify using such 
a criterion, once it is shown to have a disparate impact on women, if it is a 
business necessity for the jobY The ABA, for example, rated women low 
for the failure to have worked for a large firm, an accomplishment nearly 
impossible for women to have met because large firms openly refused to 
hire women attorneys until recently.33 When Sandra Day O'Connor and 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg were recent law school graduates, law firms told them 
explicitly that they would not hire women.34 When President Reagan nomi-
nated Justice O'Connor, critics argued she was not qualified because she 
had not worked for a large firm; when President Bush nominated Harriet 
Miers, who had been a managing partner for her law firm, critics claimed 
28. Cook, supra note 22, at 597-99. 
29. /d. at 599-600. 
30. See Elaine Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan 
and Carter Administrations, 71 JUDICATURE 136, 138-39 (1987) [hereinafter Martin, Gender 
and Judicial Selection]; Elaine Martin, Women on the Federal Bench: A Comparative Pro-
file, 65 JUDICATURE 306, 309 (1982) [hereinafter Martin, Women on the Federal Bench]. 
31. KENNEY, supra note 20, at 148-51. 
32. /d. 
33. Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection, supra note 30, at 138-39; Martin, Women 
on the Federal Bench, supra note 30, at 309; KENNEY, supra note 17, at 78-79. 
34. Not until 1984, twenty years after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
outlawing sex discrimination in employment, did the Supreme Court declare that the Act 
covered law firms in Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
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she was unqualified because she had not served as a judge. 35 Opponents of 
Elena Kagan made similar arguments.36 The most important qualification 
for judicial office always seems to shift to something women achieve at 
lower rates than men, and selectors also apply a double standard to women. 
Using the selection criterion of being known to judges or selectors 
constitutes disparate impact. The old adage is a judge is a lawyer who 
knows a senator. Women were not just excluded from the large law firms, 
but all spheres of influence in the legal profession, making it harder for 
them to be known to people of importance. Elaine Martin's survey of the 
women President Carter appointed to the federal bench revealed that they 
believed that under the previous system, to be considered for a judgeship, 
one had to be known by senior judges. Her survey found that 43% of the 
women felt that they would not have been considered under the previous 
system because they lacked the political influence and credentials.37 By de-
emphasizing political connections, Carter's judicial nominating commis-
sions let the women candidates' stronger academic credentials emerge. 38 
Moreover, Martin discovered that circuit nominating commissions imposed 
a standard of judicial experience on women but not men candidates because 
they doubted women's abilities despite other credentials.39 
What constitutes merit in judicial candidates-academic excellence, or 
knowing a senator? Martin found Presidents Carter and Reagan held men 
and women nominees to different standards. 40 President Carter required 
women but not men to have prior judicial experience and women to have a 
demonstrable commitment to equal justice under law.41 President Reagan 
required women but not men to have prosecutorial experience and party 
political experience.42 Debating the qualifications of one nominee at a time 
can conceal the operation of a gendered double standard. 
The concept of the pipeline refers to the path lawyers follow to be 
judges, and that path varies between state and federal office, among judges, 
35. Tom Curry, For Court Clout, No Judicial Experience Needed, NBCNEWS.COM 
(May 12, 2010, 10:20 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/37072697/ns/politics-
supreme _ court/t/court-clout-no-judicial-experience-needed/#. UWBdm V cd _gk. 
36. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Case Against Sotomayor, NEW REPUBLIC (May 4, 2009, 
12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/the-case-against-sotomayor?id=45d56e6f-
f497-4b19-9c63-04e10199a085. NPR reporter Nina Totenberg once again cut through the 
gender double standard about judicial experience. Nina Totenberg, Should Kagan's Lack of 
Judicial Experience Matter?, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 12, 2010), 
http://www .npr.org/templates/story /story .php?storyld== 1267 64692. 
37. Martin, Women on the Federal Bench, supra note 30, at 308. 
38. Id at 312. 
39. See id. 
40. See Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection, supra note 30, at 139-40. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. at 140. 
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and over time.43 When President Obama nominated Elena Kagan (who had 
no previous judicial experience), for the first time in history all nine of the 
current sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices had served as federal appeals 
court judges.44 U.S. Supreme Court Justices generally graduate from elite 
law schools (usually the Ivy League), serve as editors-in-chief of their law 
reviews, clerk for federal judges (preferably U.S. Supreme Court justices), 
have some experience working for large elite law firms, work in the U.S. 
Attorney's Office or for the Justice Department, and serve on a federal dis-
trict and then a federal appeals court. Employment discrimination offers 
helpful concepts for interrogating whether the pipeline is discriminatory. If 
we adopt the requirement that all U.S. Supreme Court nominees must have 
previously served on a federal court of appeals, that requirement has a dis-
parate impact on women and will ensure few women are in the pool. We 
should challenge the assumption that working in a large firm on commercial 
law is necessarily a sign of greater merit than serving as a public defender, 
public interest lawyer, or family law specialist. Requiring litigation experi-
ence might make sense for trial court judges, but should we not consider 
legal academics, legislators, and governors for the appellate courts? 
The final relevant concept is the concept of the pyramid. Women's 
groups operate on the implicit assumption that if we get women into lower 
judicial offices they will necessarily trickle up into higher judicial offices. 
An examination of the numbers from the qualified labor pool, however, 
reveals that no such necessary relationship exists. Martin's evidence sug-
gests that the pipeline may be different for men and women.45 Men may 
pursue a lucrative private practice and then leapfrog into a state supreme 
court or a lower federal court position, but women do not seem to be able to 
do so as easily. Moreover, women may find it more difficult than men to be 
promoted from lower courts. Critics argued that Justice O'Connor's service 
on the Arizona courts did not constitute a sufficiently meritorious back-
ground worthy of an appointment on the U.S. Supreme Court. We have 
learned from feminist labor historians that when women start to gain the 
credentials for a particular position, the requirements tend to change. Expe-
rience with the double standard and a gendered pipeline leads us to be wary 
of thinking if we simply get women into the feeder positions, they will au-
tomatically ascend to high judicial office. 
Two other concepts from feminist theory are relevant to our discus-
sion: tokenism and backlash. In her canonical work, Men and Women of the 
43. Margaret S. Williams, In a Different Path: The Process of Becoming a Judge for 
Women and Men, 90 JUDICATURE 104, 104-13 (2006) (discussing the various ways in which 
judges in Texas have risen to that position). 
44. Totenberg, supra note 36. 
45. See generally Martin, Women on the Federal Bench, supra note 30; Martin, 
Gender and Judicial Selection, supra note 30. 
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Corporation, Rosabeth Moss Kanter described how a corporation would 
hire one woman for a position to show that the enterprise was not closed to 
women altogether, but that the woman would be isolated, be seen as the 
representative of her group rather than an individual, and always be marked 
as "other. "46 Only when they reach a certain size do courts seem to have 
room for a token woman.47 As early as 1978, however, Cook found that as a 
solitary token woman moved up the hierarchy, she would not necessarily be 
replaced by another woman.48 The recent evidence of both Justice Sandra 
Day O'Connor and Chief Judge Judith Kaye of New York49 being replaced 
by men suggests no fixed women's seats exist. Rorie L. Spill's and Kathe-
leen A. Bratton's research showed that President Clinton was likely to re-
place African American judges with other African Americans, but he only 
replaced one of the five women who left the bench with another woman.50 
Criminology, Law, and Society professors Jon Gould and Linda Merola 
conducted research for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 
and found that judges who were "first" (minority or woman) to hold a seat 
felt less confident about winning; they also documented how important it is 
to break the run of all white male office-holders. 51 If the ceiling consists of 
merely one woman no matter the size of the pool, the evidence also under-
mines the argument that the number of women in the pool drives the num-
ber of women serving. Bratton and Spill found it was more likely that a 
governor would choose a woman for the state supreme court if the court had 
46. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 206-07 
(1977). 
47. See Beverly Blair Cook, Political Culture and Selection of Women Judges in 
Trial Courts, in WOMEN IN LOCAL POLITICS 42 (Debra W. Stewart ed., 1980) (hereinafter 
Cook, Political Culture]; Beverly Blair Cook, Women Judges in the Opportunity Structure, 
in WOMEN, THE COURTS, AND EQUALITY 143, 149-52, 170-71 (Laura L. Crites & Winifted L. 
Hepperle eds., 1987) [hereinafter Cook, Women Judges]; Alozie, supra note 26; Kathleen A. 
Bratton & Rorie L. Spill, Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection: The Role of the Appoint-
ment Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme Courts, 83 Soc. SCI. Q. 504 
(2002); Cook, supra note 22; Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 26, at 340-42; Rorie L. Spill 
Solberg & Kathleen A. Bratton, DiversifYing the Federal Bench: Presidential Patterns, 26 
JUST. SYS. J. 119 (2005). 
48. See Cook, supra note 21, at 95-97 (discussing the structure of female representa-
tion in the courts). 
49. Judge Judith Kaye was the Chief Judge of the state of New York and the first 
woman to hold that position. When she retired in 2008, the nominating commission sent the 
Governor a list of seven men's names. The Governor chose one from the list, as state law 
required. John Eligon, Paterson Picks Chief Judge Nominee, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0 1/14/nyregion/14judge.html? _ r=O#. 
50. Spill & Bratton, supra note 26, at 258. 
51. CTR. FOR JUSTICE, LAW & SOC'Y, IMPROVING DNERSITY ON THE STATE COURTS: 
A REPORT FROM THE BENCH 31 (2009), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org 
/media/cms/DiversityReport2009 _ 4F739EOE5591 O.pdf. 
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no women members.52 Their research suggests that selectors wanted at least 
token representation, and the credit and attention for appointing a "first. "53 
But their research bodes ill for women's prospects of increasing their repre-
sentation on courts if selectors are less likely to pick women for positions 
when a woman already sits on that court, that is to say, if the ceiling for 
women is one position. 
The idea of the token is that only one spot exists for a marginalized 
category. The idea of backlash is that resistance increases and is qualitative-
ly different as more women progress. 54 Kanter hypothesized that once wom-
en moved from token to minority, and then towards parity, resistance would 
soften.55 Some evidence suggests, however, that resistance to women may 
harden precisely because they are progressing. 56 A token woman does not 
threaten the coding of a job-judge, or law professor-as male; instead, the 
token woman is exceptional, the honorary male. But as more women enter a 
profession, rather than the job being coded as neither exclusively male nor 
female, the job may tip to the other category57 with deleterious consequenc-
es for pay and status, as in the example of women doctors in the former 
Soviet Union. Men in a job category may defend the male prerogative more 
fiercely as women gain in numbers and power. Admittedly, it is hard to dis-
entangle resistance to women that is plain old sexism and misogyny from 
resistance expressly to women's progress. But we do have some evidence to 
support the backlash hypothesis. For example, voters removed from office 
Rose Bird, the first woman on the California Supreme Court and also its 
Chief Justice.58 Explaining her demise merely as a result of the antipathy 
agribusiness had for her as a result of her stint as Secretary of Agriculture or 
as a result of her opposition to the death penalty fails to fully account for the 
hostility of her colleagues and the legal profession and her electoral vulner-
ability. Only by adding gender and perhaps backlash to the equation can we 
understand what happened.59 Similarly, it appears that women may face 
52. Bratton & Spill, supra note 47, at 514-15. 
53. See id. at 515. 
54. See SUSAN F ALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN 
WOMEN, at xix (1991); Mary Hawkesworth, Analyzing Backlash: Feminist Standpoint Theo-
ry as Analytical Tool, 22 WOMEN'S STUD. 1NT'L F. 135, 136 (1999); Sally J. Kenney, New 
Research on Gendered Political Institutions, 49 POL. RES. Q. 445, 448-49 (1996); Jane 
Mansbridge & Shauna L. Shames, Toward a Theory of Backlash: Dynamic Resistance and 
the Central Role of Power, 4 POL. & GENDER 623, 623-26 (2008). 
55. KANTER, supra note 46, at 206-42. 
56. See, e.g., Patricia MacCorquoda1c & Gary Jensen, Women in the Law: Partners 
or Tokens?, 7 GENDER & Soc'Y 582, 583 (1993); Janice D. Yoder, Rethinking Tokenism: 
Looking Beyond Numbers, 5 GENDER & Soc'y 178, 180-81 (1991). 
57. See KENNEY, supra note 20. 
58. See KENNEY, supra note 17, at 154-60. 
59. See id.; BETTY MEDSGER, FRAMED: THE NEW RIGHT ATTACK ON CHIEF JUSTICE 
ROSE BIRD AND THE COURTS (1983). 
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more motions to recuse themselves as their numbers increase.60 In addition, 
at times, it has taken longer for women to win Senate confirmation than 
men, regardless of ideology or qualifications. In Australia and Canada, legal 
scholars are beginning to explore the backlash hypothesis and construct 
clearer empirical tests to support the claim.61 
Rosemary Hunter's analysis of women judges in Australia shows that 
behind the recent numbers of women appointments "lurks an undercurrent 
of hostility toward women judges, which shows no sign of abating in the 
near future."62 According to Hunter, women judges experience what Rosa-
beth Moss Kanter called heightened attention: their colleagues and the me-
dia dispute their qualifications and show open hostility to them.63 She notes 
that women judges' colleagues "hold them in contempt simply for being 
women."64 The assumption is that men are the natural occupants of such 
positions, that women obtain them through political maneuvering, not merit, 
and that enough women have been appointed.65 Moreover, evidence from 
Canada suggests that women judges are far more likely than men to have 
their objectivity challenged and gender-based conflicts of interest asserted.66 
Litigants seem to miss the irony that if the gender of the woman judge poses 
a conflict in a rape or employment discrimination case, the same goes for 
the gender of a male judge. 
I. HOW JUDGES ARE SELECTED: A NON-MERIT SYSTEM THAT FAVORS 
MEN 
Appointments to the federal bench have always been party patronage 
positions, even as senators or presidents occasionally recommended judges 
from another party.67 As a formal matter, the President recommends candi-
dates to the U.S. Senate, which must confirm them by a simple majority 
vote. Traditionally, the President deferred to senators of his own party from 
60. Constance Baker Motley, Reflections, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1450 (2002). 
61. See, e.g., Reg Graycar, Claire L 'Heureux-Dube: Reflections from Down Under, 
in ADDING FEMINISM TO LAW: THE CONTRIDUTIONS OF JUSTICE CLAIRE L'HEUREUX-DUBE 81 
(Elizabeth Sheehy ed., 2004); Rosemary Hunter, The High Price of Success: The Backlash 
Against Women Judges in Australia, in CALLING FOR CHANGE: WOMEN, LAW, AND THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 281 (Elizabeth Sheehy & Sheila Mcintyre eds., 2006); MARGARET 
THORNTON, DISSONANCE AND DISTRUST: WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1996). 
62. Hunter, supra note 61, at 281. 
63. See id. at 282-83. 
64. /d. at 295. 
65. See id. at 284-88. 
66. Constance Backhouse, The Chilly Climate for Women Judges: Reflections on the 
Backlash from the Ewanchuk Case, 15 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 167, 168 (2003); Maryka 
Omatsu, The Fiction of Judicial Impartiality, 9 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. I, 1-2 (1997). 
67. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM 
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 9-14 ( 1997). 
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the home state for district court judges, relied upon them heavily for circuit 
court appointments, and consulted key senators as a whole on appointments 
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Senators from the state of the vacancy of either 
party, however, may in effect veto an appointment or subject committee 
hearings to delay by not returning their "blue slip"68 on the nominee; alt-
hough more recently, not all Senate Judiciary chairs have deferred.69 The 
chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee may delay or refuse to hold a hear-
ing, and the Senate Majority Leader may refuse to schedule a floor vote 
(usually a voice vote but occasionally a roll call vote). More recently, sena-
tors have threatened the filibuster to prevent confirmation. Thus, senators 
have many ways of delaying or opposing judicial nominees while avoiding 
the public accountability of a roll call vote.70 Senators have been known to 
block nominees for personal grudges as well as ideological and partisan 
differences, most recently in Pennsylvania.71 
Since 1953, presidents have called upon the ABA's Standing Commit-
tee on the Federal Judiciary to rate nominees before their public nomination 
as a regular part of the process. 72 The Justice Department referred their files 
68. Once the President makes a nomination, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee sends out blue slips to the two senators from the nominee's home state. Id. If either 
senator returns the slip with the mark "objection," traditionally no hearing on the nomination 
is scheduled. Id. If both senators return the slip marked "no objection," the subcommittee and 
then full committee proceed to hearings. /d. Senators who object to a choice may simply fail 
to return the blue slip altogether, delaying the process without having to take responsibility 
for opposing the nomination. !d. 
69. 1979 Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Edward Kennedy shared Carter's com-
mitment to a diverse and representative bench and relaxed the policy, announcing that failure 
to return a blue slip would no longer automatically stall a hearing on a nominee, making it 
easier for Carter's nominees to be confirmed. See id. at 12 n.j; Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., A 
President's Legacy: Gender and Appointment to the Federal Courts, in THE OTHER ELITES: 
WOMEN, POLITICS, AND POWER IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 147-66 (MaryAnne Borrelli & 
Janet M. Martin eds., 1997); Elliot E. Slotnick, The Changing Role of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in Judicial Selection, 62 JUDICATURE 502, 503-06 ( 1979). 
70. Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege, and Power: The Senate's Role in the 
Appointment of Federal Judges, 86 JUDICATURE 24, 26-27 (2002); Hendrik Hertzberg, Fili-
bluster, NEW YORKER (June 13, 2005), at 63; Nancy Scherer, The Judicial Confirmation 
Process: Mobilizing Elites, Mobilizing Masses, 86 JUDICATURE 240, 248-49 (2003); Elliot E. 
Slotnick, A Historical Perspective on Federal Judicial Selection, 86 JUDICATURE 13, 14-16 
(2002). 
71. See, e.g., Kate Zernike, In Act of Defiance, Democrat Stalls Obama Choice for 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/0l/06/nyregion/senator-
robert-menendez-stalls-obama-move-to-promote-judge-patty-shwartz.htrnl (discussing how 
Senator Menendez blocked the appointment of Patty Shwartz to the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals). 
72. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT Is 
AND How IT WORKS 1 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/scfedjud/federal_judiciary09.authcheckdam.pdf. President George W. Bush 
had suspended the practice but President Obama reinstated it. Editorial, The A.B.A. and Judi-
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to both the FBI and IRS once the President's administration had fully vetted 
them but before sending their nominations to the Senate.73 The ABA cham-
pions its ideal of merit rather than political loyalty.74 Feminists have criti-
cized the gender composition of this Committee and its standards;75 Brooks-
ley Elizabeth Born was the Committee's first woman member in its twenty-
five-year history, serving from 1977 to 1983 and as its chair from 1980 to 
1983.76 The Committee favored judicial experience and large firm practice 
over academic work, government lawyering, or public defense and legal aid. 
It demanded trial experience, particularly membership in the American Col-
lege of Trial Lawyers.77 And, in Carter's time, it automatically gave judges 
older than sixty-four an unqualified rating.78 Feminists criticized the stand-
ards, which they argued constituted disparate impact discrimination, and 
also objected to how they seemed to apply only to women and how the 
Committee made exceptions for men. Conservatives have charged that the 
Committee rates far-right nominees as less qualified because of their judi-
cial temperament, most notably in the Committee's split vote over the rating 
for Robert Bark. 79 
Each president also has his own system for choosing nominees, shar-
ing responsibilities between the Attorney General (overseeing the Depart-
ment of Justice with the staff to investigate large numbers of candidates) 
and the White House Counsel's office. While appointments to the U.S. Su-
preme Court have often. reflected contentious issues of the day, whether 
they be Federalists versus anti-Federalists, supporters or opponents of a 
national bank, supporters or opponents of slavery, supporters of the New 
Deal or of liberty of contract, President Nixon was the first president to 
cia! Nominees, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/opinion/14tue2.html. 
73. See GOLDMAN, supra note 67, at 9-13. 
74. AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 72, at I. 
75. See Mary L. Clark, One Man's Token Is Another Woman's Breakthrough? The 
Appointment of the First Women Federal Judges, 49 VILL. L. REV. 487,490-92 (2004); Mar-
tin, Women on the Federal Bench, supra note 30, at 309. 
76. FEMINISTS WHO CHANGED AMERICA: 1963-1975, at 50 (Barbara J. Love ed., 
2006); Susan Ness & Fredrica Wechsler, Women Judges-Why So Few?, GRADUATE 
WOMAN, Nov.-Dec. 1979, at I 0, 48. In 2012, the committee had five women members out of 
fifteen. Members: Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary 2011-2012, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/federal_judiciary/about_us/members.html 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
77. Dolores Korman Sloviter, Personal Reflections, 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 855, 858 
(2005); Ness & Wechsler, supra note 76, at 48. 
78. See GOLDMAN, supra note 67, at 275. 
79. Stuart Taylor Jr., A.B.A. Panel Gives Bark a Top Rating but Vote Is Split, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 10, 1987), at AI. Four members of the Committee found President Bush's 
nominee, Judge Robert Bork, to be unqua1ified./d. The Senate failed to confirm him in 1987. 
Linda Greenhouse, Bark's Nomination Is Rejected, 58-42; Reagan 'Saddened,' N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 24, 1987, at I. 
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make ideology rather than party loyalty or personal connections the most 
important criterion for selecting federal court judges.8° Keeping his cam-
paign promise to appoint strict constructionists (meaning judges who were 
supportive of the police and not interested in expanding the rights of the 
accused nor supportive of court-ordered busing to achieve racial integra-
tion), President Nixon charged his Attorney General, John Mitchell, to vet 
judicial candidates to ensure their policy views aligned with his. Until Pres-
ident Carter's Administration, the Justice Department exclusively handled 
district and circuit court appointments, mostly by deferring to senators. 
Since President Carter, White House staffers have actively participated in 
the selection of judges, and President Obama is no exception. 
II. PRESIDENT CARTER PUTS GENDER ON THE AGENDA 
President Roosevelt appointed the first woman to the federal bench, 
Florence Allen, in 1934.81 Sixteen years later, Truman appointed a second, 
but President Eisenhower appointed no women to the federal bench.82 Presi-
dents Kennedy, Nixon, and Ford appointed one each; President Johnson 
appointed threeY President Carter's appointment of forty women to the 
federal bench was thus a very dramatic policy change.84 President Carter 
declared a gender-integrated and racially-integrated bench to be a priority, 
charged his staff with implementing that policy, and altered the way he 
chose federal judges.85 When President Carter took office, four women 
served on federal courts, although women made up about 15% of recent law 
school graduates and 9.2% of all lawyers.86 The eligible pool of lawyers 
with twenty-five years of practice was closer to 3.5%, however. Carter's 
appointment of forty women (increasing the number from four to forty-four) 
is huge compared to Johnson's three, or the others' appointment of a token 
one, and his percentage of appointees at 15% is large considering how gate-
keepers defined the eligible pool at the timeY 
Goldman and others analyzed President Carter's judicial appoint-
ments.88 They documented President Carter's policies, his changes in the 
judicial selection procedures, and the results.89 But an important player in 
80. NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER 
fEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 50 (2005). 
81. Clark, supra note 75, at 493. 
82. /d. at 492. 
83. /d. at 493. 
84. Martin, supra note 14, at II 0. 
85. /d. at 114. 
86. /d. at Ill. 
87. /d. at 110. 
88. GOLDMAN, supra note 67, at 236-83. 
89. /d. 
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the gender diversity of the bench deserves more credit for this accomplish-
ment. Only thirty-two years old, Margaret McKenna was the first woman to 
hold the position of Deputy White House Counsel.90 Having been editor of 
the Law Review at Southern Methodist University Law School, she tried 
race discrimination cases as a trial attorney in the Civil Rights Division of 
the Justice Department and later coordinated the Rhode Island Carter-
Mondale campaign. She served on the transition team for the Justice De-
partment and worked closely with President Carter's designate for Attorney 
General, Judge Griffin Bell. Deputy White House Counsel Douglas Huron 
and her boss, White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz, shared McKenna's 
commitment to a racially and gender-diverse federal bench, but McKenna 
made that goal a reality.9' 
McKenna, Lipshutz, and Huron overcame a number of significant ob-
stacles. First, McKenna connected President Carter's commitment to merit 
selection and racial diversity for judges to his commitment to bringing 
women in to governmental positions more generally. She shaped President 
Carter's policy on affirmative action. Second, she persuaded the newly-
created circuit nominating commissions, and later senators advocating for 
federal district court appointments, to include women on their lists of rec-
ommendations. Third, she wrested control over the decision on judicial 
nominations from the Justice Department, and particularly from Attorney 
General Bell and his Deputy Attorney General, Mike Eagan, and brought 
the White House Counsel's office into the deliberations. Fourth, the Admin-
istration fought the ABA's tendency to rate all the women and minority men 
candidates "not qualified," destroying their chances at confirmation.92 
McKenna succeeded because she made this issue a priority and because she 
was the insider working strategically with a network of women's groups on 
the outside. 
III. FEMTNTSTS WORKING INSIDE AND OUT: THE WORK OF OUTSIDERS 
Political scientist Beverly Blair Cook documented how feminists 
worked to secure the appointment of women judges immediately after suf-
frage.93 It was not until almost fifty years later that women's rights groups 
90. KENNEY, supra note 17, at 71. 
91. Mary L. Clark, Changing the Face of the Law: How Women's Advocacy Groups 
Put Women on the Federal Judicial Appointments Agenda, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 243, 
245 (2002); Interview by Sarah Wilson with Barbara Babcock (May 19, 1995); Telephone 
Interview with Margaret McKenna (June 25, 2007). 
92. Maya Sen, Below the Bar? Racial and Gender Bias in Judicial Nominations, I, 
20-21 (Apr. 30, 20 12), http://visionsinmethodology.org/wp-content/uploads/20 12/04/Sen _ 
VIM2012.pdf. 
93. Beverly B. Cook, Women as Judges, in WOMEN IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9, 9-24 
(Beverly B. Cook et al. eds., 1988). 
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would gain traction protesting the open exclusion of women from consid-
eration.94 When Justices Harlan and Black retired in 1971, and Nixon prom-
ised to eschew litmus tests and to "appoint the best man for the job," Liz 
Carpenter, Lady Bird Johnson's press secretary who was well connected 
with women in the Washington Press Corps and active in the National 
Women's Political Caucus, enlisted the help of Virginia Kerr, a National 
Women's Political Caucus staff member helping with the set-up of the na-
tional office and working on press and legislative testimony.95 Kerr's dra-
matically successful press release "turned the taken-for-granted male mo-
nopoly into a gaffe.'096 Women's groups not only urged President Ford to 
appoint a woman to replace William 0. Douglas, but also protested that the 
President's advisers on this matter were all men and mostly opponents of 
the Equal Rights Amendment.97 
Feminists inside the Carter Administration formed a Washington 
Women's Network that grew to more than 1,200 women-women who 
were networked with each other as well as outside groups.98 They "publi-
cized information about the judgeships, recruited and screened candidates, 
and lobbied for candidates they believed to be well-qualified."99 Second, 
they formed specific projects to generate names and work for their nomina-
tion. By forming broad coalitions, they ensured a wide audience for their 
efforts, troops to deploy across a broad spectrum of the women's communi-
ty, and clout on their letterhead when they wrote to the White House as the 
Judicial Selection Project. Third, these groups met with White House staff 
to press their case and plan a course of action. 100 
Fourth, these groups were whistleblowers who monitored the Admin-
istration's performance in meeting its new policy objectives and communi-
cated their dissatisfaction at the results to their constituencies, the media, 
and the White House through a series of press releases and fact sheets, de-
94. See id.; Cook, Supreme Court Candidates, supra note 11, at 314-16, 323-34. 
95. Sally Kenney, Nixon Gaffe Sparks Era of Judicial Advance, WOMEN'S ENEWS 
(May 4, 2009), http:/lwomensenews.org/story/our-story/090504/nixon-gaffe-sparks-era-
judicial-advance. 
96. !d.; Interview with Virginia Kerr (Feb. 2007); E-mail from Virginia Kerr to 
Sally J. Kenney (Feb. 2009) (on file with author). 
97. Kenney, supra note 95; JANET M. MARTIN, THE PRESIDENCY AND WOMEN: 
PROMISE, PERFORMANCE & ILLUSION 186 (2003). 
98. Arvonne S. Fraser, Insiders and Outsiders: Women in the Political Arena, in 
WOMEN IN WASHINGTON: ADVOCATES FOR PUBLIC POLICY 120, 138 (Irene Tinkered., 1983); 
Clark, supra note 91, at 246; See Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection, supra note 30, at 
142; see also Beverly B. Cook, The First Woman Candidate for the Supreme Court, in 
SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY: 1981 YEARBOOK 13, 13-34 (2008), available at 
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/wp-
content/themes!supremecourthistory/inc/schs _publications-198I.pdf. 
99. Ness & Wechsler, supra note 76, at 49. 
100. GOLDMAN, supra note 67, at 253. 
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manding that the Administration do more. 101 The National Women's Politi-
cal Caucus, for example, released statistics in early January 1979 that fifty-
one out of the fifty-nine recommendations from Democratic senators for the 
new judgeships were white males. 102 Fifth, women's groups lobbied on 
many fronts. They met with the Administration to suggest names of panel-
ists for the new circuit nominating commissions President Carter mandated, 
pressured senators to appoint women to their nominating commissions, crit-
icized recommendations of only white men, and pressed for the women who 
did appear on the list. They testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
about the slow pace of women's judicial appointments and pressured the 
Committee to require nominees to refrain from membership in discriminato-
ry clubs. 103 Sixth, they set up their own screening panel to decide which 
candidates they wanted to promote. Seventh, they formed an organization of 
women judges. In 1979, the National Association ofWomen Judges formed, 
and part of its mission included advocating women's appointments at the 
federal, state, and local levels, as well as training women for election and 
selection. 104 One of its first resolutions was to call for the appointment of a 
woman to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the group lobbied both presidential 
candidates to commit to such an appointment. Ronald Reagan took the 
pledge, but President Carter refused. 
In the United States, judges are more recognizable as public figures 
than elsewhere, so feminists seeking symbols of women's progress in shar-
ing political power with men have at times prioritized the appointment of 
women to state supreme courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. But even in the 
United States, feminists have not always consistently campaigned for the 
appointment or election of women judges and, when they have done so, it 
has been done by projects or organizations that separate themselves from 
those seeking to increase the number in legislative and executive positions. 
The efforts of the National Women's Political Caucus in the 1970s, for ex-
ample, are now defunct at both the national and state level. Groups such as 
the National Association of Women Judges (NA WJ), who championed the 
appointment of a woman to the U.S. Supreme Court, have turned to other 
issues in addition to the appointment of women judges; although, former 
NA WJ president and judge on the Massachusetts Appeals Court, Femande 
Duffly, did testify for Sotomayor. Groups whose mission is to grasp politi-
cal power for women, such as EMILY's List, do not raise money for women 
judicial candidates, despite the fact that many state court judges are elected 
101. Susan Ness, A Sexist Selection Process Keeps Qualified Women Off the Bench, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 1978), at C8. 
102. GOLDMAN, supra note 67, at 258. 
103. Clark, supra note 91, at 247. 
104. !d. at 250. 
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officials. Although it does recruit for judicial races, the White House Project 
focuses mainly on non-judicial elective offices. 
Many of those who champion the cause of a gender-diverse judiciary 
also advocate for judicial independence and merit selection. 105 They want to 
define law as a system of rules and principles governed by decision-making 
processes vastly different from legislatures and bureaucracies. Those of us 
who see law and legal decision making as inherently political and as the 
province of political scientists have not articulated the differences between 
legal decision-making and other kinds of political decision-making in ways 
that are easily understood by the public. The politics of law, then, and the 
politics of judicial selection, are almost always conducted using rhetoric that 
eschews politics. For example, President George H.W. Bush announced that 
politics and race had nothing to do with his decision, but rather that Clar-
ence Thomas just happened to be the best man for the job. Senator Leahy, 
responding to the resignation of Justice Powell, declared that partisan poli-
tics would play no part in the Judiciary Committee's deliberations on Robert 
Bork; they would merely consider his merit as a judge. This conundrum 
plagues campaigns to create a gender-diverse bench, since most advocates 
have to try to expose the politics and cronyism of reigning judicial selection 
regimes while contending that their motivations are not political; they assert 
that they believe in merit selection, but they also want more women. 
IV. COMPARING PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS 
Presidential appointments of women judges have varied enormously 
rather than followed a pattern of steady increases reflecting women's great-
er presence in the legal profession or even the overall strength of the femi-
nist movement. Women insiders pushed for the appointment of women 
judges with few, yet notable, successes from 1920 to 1976.106 Only eight 
women had served on Article III federal courts when President Carter took 
office in 1976.107 President Carter appointed more women than all previous 
presidents combined; he appointed forty women, which was 15.5% of his 
appointments. 108 Reacting to new evidence of a widening gender gap in sup-
port for his presidency, Ronald Reagan outflanked President Carter during 
the 1980 campaign by promising to appoint a woman to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which he did. 109 The fanfare over the appointment of the first woman 
105. See generally KENNEY,supra note 59. 
I 06. Clark, supra note 75, at 492-93; Cook, Supreme Court Candidates, supra note 
11, at 323-24; Kenney, supra note II, at 210. 
I 07. Sloviter, supra note 77, at 857. 
I 08. Pacelle, supra note 69, at 155. 
109. Carter was grooming Ninth Circuit judge Shirley Hufstedler, who served as 
Carter's Secretary of Education, for a Supreme Court appointment. Sheldon Goldman, Book 
Review, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 222,223 (2002) (reviewing DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT 
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to the U.S. Supreme Court, Sandra Day O'Connor, deflected attention from 
the fact that only 7.6% of Reagan's judicial appointments were women. 110 
President George H.W. Bush appointed few women in the first two years of 
his presidency, but following his appointment of Clarence Thomas to the 
U.S. Supreme Court and the backlash surrounding Anita Hill's testimony, 
Bush appointed nearly half of his thirty-six women appointees in the year he 
ran for re-election} 11 Only 19.5% of his appointments were women, but 
most of those were Reagan appointees he elevated from the district to the 
circuit appellate courts, which did little to change the overall gender compo-
sition of the federal bench. 112 Bush did give women major roles in the judi-
cial selection process; Lee Lieberman was Assistant White House Counsel 
and Barbara Drake was Assistant Attorney General in the Department of 
Justice. 113 Despite President Clinton facing a Republican-controlled Senate 
after 1994, facing political machinations that disproportionately delayed 
women and minority men nominees, and eventually facing impeachment 
proceedings, 28% of his appointments to the federal bench were women, 
compared to 22% for President George W. Bush} 14 Forty-two percent of 
Obama' s nominees have been women, 115 including two women nominated 
to the U.S. Supreme Court} 16 Since the Carter Administration, with the ex-
ception of the Infinity Project in the Eighth Circuit, feminist groups have 
largely dismantled their efforts to press for women appointments, and new 
groups have not taken up the charge. 117 
V. WOMEN ON STATE COURTS 
In 1923, Florence Allen became the first woman in the United States 
to serve as a judge on a state supreme court, joining the Ohio Supreme 
OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 
(1999)). Had Carter not been expected to name a woman to the Supreme Court for the next 
vacancy, "it is questionable whether Ronald Reagan would have made his pledge to appoint 
a woman to the Supreme Court during the fall 1980 presidential campaign." /d. Similarly, 
Gerald Ford nominated his one woman to the federal bench, Mary Anne Reimann Richey, 
after candidate Jimmy Carter had promised to appoint more women to the bench. Clark, 
supra note 75, at 533. 
110. Pacelle reports that Reagan's record improved when "two women were brought 
into the circle of advisers who screened potential nominees." Pacelle,supra note 69, at 158. 
Ill. /d.at159. 
112. Martin, supra note 14, at 117. 
113. Pacelle, supra note 69, at 159. 
114. Segal Diascro & Spill Solberg, supra note 15, at 292. 
115. ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION SNAPSHOT (2012), available at 
http://www.afj.org/judicial-selection/judicial-selection-snapshot.pdf. 
116. Carl Tobias, Justifying Diversity in the Federal Judiciary, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 
283,290 (2012). 
117. See INFINITY PROJECT, http://www.theinfinityproject.org (last visited Dec. 18, 
2012). 
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Court. 118 It would be thirty-six years later before Rhoda Lewis joined the 
Hawaii Supreme Court in 1959.119 Not until 2002 would the ftrst woman 
join the South Dakota Supreme Court, which was the last all-male state su-
preme court! 2° Four women joined their state supreme courts in the 1960s, 
twelve in the 1970s, eighteen in the 1980s, and twelve more in the 1990s. 121 
Some appointments, such as Rosalie Wahl's in Minnesota, were highly 
dramatic. 122 Others, such as Linda Kinney Neuman, who joined the Iowa 
Supreme Court in 1986, appointed by a Republican governor, generated 
almost no notice. California voters turned the ftrst woman appointed chief 
justice out of offtce in a retention election; voters similarly rejected one of 
the ftrst women to serve on the Tennessee State Supreme Court, Justice 
Penny White. 123 Some states elect judges in partisan elections, others elect 
judges in non-partisan elections, others appoint judges and have them stand 
for retention election with no opponent, and still others use the federal sys-
tem with lifetime appointment and no retention election. 124 
Few obvious patterns emerge for women's progress on state courts, 
and whatever patterns that do emerge vary widely over time. Twenty-six 
percent of state court judges in the United States are women. 125 Yet states 
vary enormously in the number of women serving, ranging from Vermont, 
which ranks ftrst with 41%, to South Dakota and Idaho, which are tied for 
last with only 13%!26 Perhaps even more puzzling than this variation is its 
erratic nature over time. The last six states to place a woman on their state 
supreme courts were not all from one region (South Dakota, New Hamp-
shire, Wyoming, Nebraska, Alaska, and Indiana). We know women have 
more difficulty being elected to legislative positions in the South and in 
rural areas more generally, but little comparative data exists for state judi-
118. See supra, note 11 and accompanying text. 
119. In August 2010, an all-male Senate Committee rejected the Governor's nomina-
tion of Katherine Leonard to be the state's first woman chief justice of the Hawaiian Su-
preme Court ostensibly because she lacked judicial experience. Nancy Cook Lauer, Hawaii 
Passes on Chance of Female Chief Justice, WOMEN'S ENEWS (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://womensenews.org/story/in-the-courts/1 00819/hawaii-passes-chance-female-chief-
justice. 
120. Kenney & Windett, supra note 16. Three states, Idaho, Indiana, and Iowa, have 
returned to all-male courts. Id 
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of Minnesota's First Woman Supreme Court Justice, 15 MOBILIZATION 135, 140 (2010). 
123. Tracie! V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the 
Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68 (1999). 
124. See Judicial Selection Methods in the States, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'v, 
http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel_state-select-map.asp (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
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Ass'N WOMEN JUDGES, http://www.nawj.org/us_state_court_statistics_2009.asp (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2012). 
126. Seeid 
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cial elections. 127 If political culture impedes women from legislative office 
in the South, it does not seem to impede women's accession to judicial of-
fice and judicial leadership: eight of thirteen chief justices of state supreme 
courts were women as of2010. 128 
The first political scientist who sought to explain why so few women 
served as judges, Beverly Blair Cook, tried to explain the large variation in 
the number of women serving on general jurisdiction trial courts in the fifty-
eight largest cities of the United States. 129 Legal academic Karen Tokarz, 
too, wondered about the large variation from Alaska, where then 21.9% of 
its judges were women, versus 1.3% in Tennessee, but she focused her in-
quiry on understanding why Missouri in particular lagged behind. 130 Alaska 
is now a laggard, not a leader, with 19%,131 but the state variation is as puz-
zling as ever. Cook asked whether Daniel Elazar's three categories of state 
political culture could explain differences among states in the number of 
women judges serving. 132 She found that moralist states (states that run 
clean governments and believe in a collective good, such as the upper New 
England States, the Upper Midwest, and several states in the West) had sig-
nificantly higher percentages of women on appellate courts, but she found 
Elazar's typology could not explain variation among states in the number of 
women general jurisdiction trial judges, nor could it explain variations 
among the cities of those states. 133 
Cook tried to refine Elazar's political culture explanation, and she 
added two gender variables. Cook found a significant but weak relationship 
between a state population's answer to the Gallup Poll question asking 
whether one would vote for a woman for president and the number of wom-
en judges in that state. 134 After Cook, other scholars tested political culture 
variables. Nicholas 0. Alozie's study of state courts of last resort in 1993 
found women represented a slightly higher percentage of judges in the 
127. See Karen L. Tokarz, Women Judges and Merit Selection Under the Missouri 
Plan, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 903, 904, 933 (1986); Tracie) V. Reid, The Competitiveness of 
Female Candidates in Judicial Elections: An Analysis of the North Carolina Trial Court 
Races, 67 ALB. L. REv. 829, 829-30 (2004) [hereinafter Reid, Competitiveness]; Tracie) V. 
Reid, Women Candidates and Judicial Elections: Telling an Untold Story, 6 POL. & GENDER 
465, 465-70 (201 0) [hereinafter Reid, Women Candidates]. 
128. Mark Curriden, Tipping the Scales: In the South, Women Have Made Huge 
Strides in the State Judiciaries, A.B.A. J. (July I, 20 I 0), 
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/tipping_the_scales. 
129. Cook, Political Culture, supra note 47, at 42. 
130. Tokarz, supra note 127, at 915. 
131. The American Bench, NAT'L ASS'N WOMEN JUDGES, 
http://www.nawj.org/us_state_court_statistics_2012.asp (last visited Dec. 12, 2012). 
132. Cook, Political Culture, supra note 47, at 42. 
133. /d. at 53-54. 
134. Cook, supra note 21, at 98-99. 
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Midwest, but that more women served as judges in the South; 135 the region 
variable, however, was not significant. 136 Bratton's and Spill's study of state 
courts of last resort showed that "relatively liberal states [were] particularly 
likely to have gender-diverse courts."137 Mark S. Hurwitz and Drew Noble 
Lanier found region as a variable did not attain statistical significance. 138 
Williams found liberal states to have more women judges only on their trial 
courts and not on their appellate courts. 139 Bratton's and Spill's study of 
federal trial courts showed that ideology had little predictive effect. 140 
If culture could not explain differences in the number of women judg-
es serving, perhaps more simple demographic variables could? Cook ob-
served what legislative scholars have more recently discovered: women 
were more likely to represent suburban and urban rather than rural constitu-
encies.141 Cook also found that the higher women's incomes and the lower 
the birthrates in a state, the greater the number of women judges. 142 Susan 
Carbon and other researchers, too, found as early as 1980 that women were 
much more likely to serve in large metropolitan areas than rural districts. 143 
Gould and Merola found a difference between rural and urban districts in 
their study of minority judges. 144 
Preliminary results from data analysis Jason Windett and I are con-
ducting show that political culture does not explain the emergence of the 
first women supreme court justices, but a gender equality culture composite 
measure does help explain the proportion of women in later decades and the 
emergence of the first woman chief justice. We are finding little evidence 
for a diffusion of innovation argument-that is, that ideas diffuse regionally 
where states emulate their neighbors. 
Our evidence supports previous findings that the size of the court mat-
ters. Cook found women were more likely to serve on larger rather than 
smaller courts. 145 In 1984, Cook identified exactly how large a court had to 
be before selectors created a woman's seat: twenty-five judges for superior 
135. Alozie, supra note 26, at 118. 
136. ld. at 122. 
137. Bratton & Spill, supra note 47, at 515. 
138. Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 26, at 348 n.l2; MarkS. Hurwitz & Drew Noble 
Lanier, Diversity in State and Federal Appellate Courts: Change and Continuity Across 20 
Years, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 47,58 (2008). 
139. Williams, supra note 27, at 1198. 
140. Spill Solberg & Bratton, supra note 47, at 130. 
141. Cook, supra note 25, at 203-04. 
142. Cook, supra note 21, at 98. 
143. Susan Carbon, Pauline Houlden & Lany Berkson, Women on the State Bench: 
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court and five judges for municipal court. 146 Her fmding was consistent with 
what scholars of legislative elections know about proportional representa-
tion and multimember constituencies: when voters or other selectors choose 
more than one city council member, legislator, or judge at a time and have 
many places to fill, they are more likely to present a balanced slate. Choos-
ing one at a time for a small number of slots yields more homogeneity and 
representation from the dominant group. The size of the court· may partly 
explain the few women in rural courts, which are smaller. Conversely, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has the highest number of wom-
en judges, but not the highest percentage of women judges, which is not 
surprising since it is the largest federal appellate court. 147 Hurwitz and La-
nier studied the composition of state supreme courts and intermediate appel-
late courts in 1985 and 1999 and found that the most consistent influence on 
women's representation across time and court was court size, which was 
positive and statistically significant with every model. 148 Alozie found size 
important in his study of state courts of last resort in 1993.149 Bratton's and 
Spill's study of state courts of last resort from 1980 to 1997 also showed 
larger courts to be more likely to be gender-diverse, 150 as did their study of 
federal courts.151 More intriguing, however, is their finding that President 
Clinton appointed a higher percentage of women to the larger courts than 
the smaller courts-Clinton filled only seven of the fifty-two small court 
vacancies with women, but filled twenty-two of the fifty-two large court 
vacancies with them. 152 If Clinton's principal goal was to diversify the 
courts, he would have appointed women to the smaller rather than the larger 
courts. Williams, too, found that the greater number of seats on a state court, 
whatever the level, the greater the representation of women. 153 
Perhaps the most obvious structural issue for investigation is method 
of selection. Do women do better under merit systems or elections? Under 
partisan or non-partisan elections? Close comparison of different systems by 
social scientists does not show that so-called merit selection systems pro-
duced more women judges-not because the requirement of being known to 
146. Cook, supra note 22, at 581. 
147. Eight out of 28, and 2 out of 15 senior judges, for a total of 10. The Judges of 
this Court in Order of Seniority, U.S. CIRCUIT CT. FOR NINTH CIRCUIT, 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view_seniority_list.php (last updated Apr. 2013). The 
Fifth Circuit has 6 of 15 (with two positions vacant); 7 of the 7 senior judges are men, Fifth 
Circuit Clerk's Office & Judges, U.S. CIRCUIT CT. FOR NINTH CIRCUIT, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiiunited _States_ Court_ of _Appeals_ for _the _Fifth_ Circuit#Curren 
t_composition_of_the_court (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
148. Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 26, at 340. 
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150. Bratton & Spill, supra note 47, at 514. 
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152. Spill & Bratton, supra note 26, at 261. 
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a senator or governor was not indirectly discriminatory, but because nomi-
nating commissions can discriminate, too, unless they have women mem-
bers; are trained to avoid discrimination and stereotyping; and make secur-
ing a gender-diverse bench a priority. Marianne Githens found, for example, 
that the Maryland Nominating Commission employed a gender double 
standard for its men and women applicants. 154 Commissioners saw women 
as uppity, seeking judicial positions above their station, whereas they saw 
men as lacking in ambition by seeking judicial appointments when they 
should have aspired to more lucrative partnerships in large firms. 155 Elec-
toral systems, too, can discriminate against women if gatekeepers keep 
women from partisan endorsements, if voters discriminate, or if women 
have difficulty raising money. 
In 1980, Susan Carbone, Pauline Houlden, and Larry Berkson sent a 
questionnaire to all 549 women state court judges.156 With the exception of 
judges that governors chose by straight appointment (who preferred nomi-
nating commissions), judges tended to declare whichever system produced 
them to be their preferred system for producing the highest quality bench 
and placing the highest number of women in judicial positions. 157 By 1988, 
Cook had concluded that no one judicial selection system produced more 
women; instead, what mattered was a commitment on the part of gatekeep-
ers to considering women and jettisoning discriminatory criteria. 158 Tokarz's 
findings that women were more likely to serve as judges in outstate Mis-
souri under an elective system than in the two cities under merit selection 
was damning to the argument that women did better under merit systems. 159 
Tokarz showed how the selection system shut out women. Tokarz conclud-
ed that merit systems were insufficient to guarantee women's full represen-
tation, if not indeed an impediment.160 Subsequent analyses confirmed To-
karz's finding of no systemic effect}61 
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What little data exist for state judicial races shows contradictory re-
sults. Tracie! Reid examined women's electoral performance in races for 
North Carolina District Court between 1994 and 1998. 162 Women raised 
more money for their races than men, but as she wrote, men "received sig-
nificantly more electoral bang for their campaign buck than women." 163 
Women incumbents did not enjoy the same benefits as men; women running 
for open seats spent much more than men to do less well. 164 Jennifer Lucas 
examined partisan and nonpartisan state supreme court elections from 1990 
to 2006 and found that women won more often than men in both partisan 
and nonpartisan elections (neither system, however, favored women more 
so than the other), and Republican women won most of all (84% of Repub-
lican women won compared to 60% of Republican men). 165 Women incum-
bents, challengers, or candidates for open seats won their races more often 
than men. 166 Gender was an important variable in predicting success, and 
incumbency did not completely trump gender. 167 Controlling for both in-
cumbency and partisanship, Lucas found women candidates to have won 
3% more of the vote in their judicial races than their men counterparts. 168 
She found women to have done better in nonpartisan election states than in 
partisan election states, but in both women did better than men. 169 
Method of selection does matter to whether women are likely to lead 
state supreme courts. 170 Women do better when the members of the court 
choose the chief justice or the position goes to the most senior justice. 171 
They do less well when governors or voters select the chief. 172 
VI. Do WOMEN JUDGE IN "A DIFFERENT VOICE?" 
How should we think about gender differences in judging in ways that 
are theoretically sophisticated, empirically true, and do not lead to women's 
disadvantage? Political scientists who study women judges have been grap-
pling with this problem for thirty years. 173 Legal academics, sociologists, 
162. Reid, Competitiveness, supra note 127, at 831. 
163. !d. at 834. 
164. /d. 
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historians, and other scholars are increasingly studying gender and judging 
across jurisdictions and legal systems. 174 Although she frequently functions 
as a straw woman, educational psychologist Carol Gilligan's work as ap-
plied to the question of whether women judges reason in a different voice 
has come to define the feminist approach to gender and judging, and ham-
pers our ability to theorize effectively about difference. 175 In her 1982 book, 
In a Different Voice, Gilligan rightly criticized theories of moral develop-
ment constructed by studying only boys. 176 Posing a hypothetical moral di-
lemma to boys and girls, and interviewing women struggling with the deci-
sion to abort, Gilligan claimed to have found a different voice of moral rea-
soning that weighed more heavily how moral decisions affected a "web of 
relationships" rather than deduced what was right from a hierarchy of prin-
ciples.177 Although Gilligan claimed to have discovered a different voice and 
many scholars criticized her methods as well as her interpretation of the 
evidence, those who took up her theory quickly labeled it the woman's 
voice. 178 This tendency to construct men and women as two dichotomous, 
non-intersecting groups of adjudicators worsens rather than recedes over 
time. As new scholars take up questions of gender and judging, rather than 
build on their predecessors, many fall into the same predictable trap of es-
sentialism (all men are x, all women are y). Although postmodemism leads 
feminists to be skeptical of binaries such as male and female, not all at-
tempts to use sex as a variable are misguided. Evidence does occasionally 
show differences worthy of feminists' attention} 79 Yet we are right to ques-
tion the sample size from which a sex difference is declared. Findings based 
on a few trial judges in Wisconsin, a few women agonizing over abortion in 
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Massachusetts, or even all judges in Michigan at one point in time do not 
prove essential sex differences. The problem is not the finding, but the 
meanings attached to it. If we abandoned the search for the essential sex 
difference that persists across time and place, we might be able to say some 
more interesting things about gender differences with empirical support. 
Rather than discovering an essentially different voice, we might uncover 
tendencies particular to a cohort. Why is it, for example, that we can gener-
alize about baby boomers, or the approach of German judges on interna-
tional or supranational courts, in ways that do not lead to the same sort of 
essentializing we see when we find sex differences? If we could fmd a way 
to talk about tendencies and overlaps-if sex were one variable among 
many-feminist scholars might not have to be so worried about essential-
Ism. 
Besides the dangers of overgeneralization that lead to claims of a false 
dichotomy, such research may wrongly claim sex to be the explanation 
when sex masks other determinants. President Carter, for example, appoint-
ed more judges to the federal bench than all other presidents combined and 
a higher percentage of women judges than any other president until Presi-
dent Clinton. If one finds sex differences among federal judges, it may 
merely be an artifact of the appointing president. But if one avoids this sec-
ond pitfall by controlling for party, ideology, or even such things as experi-
ence as a prosecutor versus experience as a public defender, then one is left 
with the concept of sex as a residual variable. Such an approach is at odds 
with a growing tendency to think of gender intersectionally within feminist 
theory. 180 Identity categories work in many intersecting ways that are pat-
terned, if not true, for all members of the group. Not all black women think 
alike, but black women lawyers who went to law school in the 1970s were 
likely to have had many common experiences. By stripping away class, 
race, and sexual orientation to drill down to the core of what constitutes sex 
differences, one inevitably approaches sex as a biological category. Femi-
nists go beyond seeing sex as a category to conceptualize gender as a social 
process, a process that is intersectional. Everyone's experience is gendered, 
not just women who are otherwise privileged. 
Scholars have used sex as a proxy for feminist, that is, more likely to 
be concerned with children and better at juvenile justice, pro-plaintiff in sex 
discrimination cases, pro-choice, pro-woman in divorce cases, employing 
comrnunitarian reasoning, inclined to seek to mediate solutions, likely to 
raise women's issues in speeches, likely to inflict harsh or lenient sentences, 
and likely to find for asylum seekers. Only occasionally has the evidence 
shown that sex is a proxy for the assumed attribute. We need to examine the 
180. See Wendy Smooth, Intersectionality in Electoral Politics: A Mess Worth Mak-
ing, 2 POL. & GENDER 400,407-10, 412-13 (2006). 
1526 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:1499 
strength of the empirical basis for the claim of difference: What was the 
sample size? How representative of the judiciary as a whole? Did the re-
searchers control for other explanatory variables? Even when researchers 
uncovered a difference, it predicted different outcomes only in some cases, 
while other predictors, such as party or ideology, predicted differences more 
reliably in others} 81 We need to take great care in how we talk about sex 
differences. Strangely, findings of no difference never seem to challenge the 
fundamental assumption of difference or deter the search for it. 
Women and men do have different life experiences. Some, but not all, 
women are mothers. Some, but not all, women are in heterosexual marriag-
es where they do the lion's share of caring labor. All experience the world 
as a woman, subject to the risks of sexual violence, gender devaluation, and 
exclusion and discrimination. Rather than identify essential sex differences, 
perhaps we should understand gender as producing tendencies among gen-
erational cohorts. When the women who are now senior judges entered the 
legal profession, they had profound experiences of exclusion in the legal 
profession. Many, such as Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Minnesota 
Supreme Court Justice Rosalie Wahl, did not enter large law firms but in-
stead worked for the government on mental health issues or, as many wom-
en did because it was one of the few places where parents could work part-
time, worked for public defenders. We can expect women who serve on the 
bench in Texas, for example, who have run as Republicans, served as prose-
cutors, and spent their time with the victims of violent crime, to have very 
different outlooks and to bring to the bench different experiences than 
women who have worked for a public defender. The Republican women 
whom President George W. Bush appointed might be as different from ear-
lier Republican women appointed to the bench as they are from Democratic 
women appointees. Even women of the same age cohort do not necessarily 
share a feminist consciousness. One need only consider the differences be-
tween Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg and between Justices Marshall and 
Thomas for the point to be clear. We must move from an assumption of 
essential sex differences to a discussion of gender. 
We should recognize that a feminist consciousness is a political 
achievement, not an inevitable result of being female or living life as a 
woman. 182 So, too, should we understand that the creation of a group of 
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Elaine Martin, Women on the Bench: A Different Voice?, 77 JUDICATURE 126,127-28 (1993); 
Elaine Martin, The Representative Role of Women Judges, 77 JUDICATURE 166, 166-67 
(1993). 
182. Patricia Yancey Martin, John R. Reynolds & Shelley Keith, Gender Bias and 
Feminist Consciousness Among Judges and Attorneys: A Standpoint Theory Analysis, 27 
SIGNS 665, 665 (2002). 
Choosing Judges: A Bumpy Road to Women's Equality 1527 
judges, men and women, who bring a gender lens to judging, is an organiza-
tional accomplishment and not an automatic result when a certain number of 
women judges join a court. In fact, the evidence suggests that women may 
feel less compelled to articulate "a woman's point of view" when more 
women are serving in a legislature. The solution is not simply in adding 
more women to the mix, but in creating organizations attentive to gender 
devaluation. Gender is a relevant category for social interaction, and the 
absence or presence of women may change group dynamics; but that does 
not mean it does so in fixed, predictable, and static ways. Particularly on 
collegiate courts, seeking diversity of experience among judges can be more 
helpful than using gender as an automatic proxy for feminist, liberal, or 
compassionate toward the downtrodden. The gender composition of groups 
matters in often subtle ways, determining what comments might be intoler-
able and how issues are framed, as well as what kinds of evidence and ar-
guments the group considers. It matters, then, that Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg is a woman, but perhaps more important is that she is an expert in sex 
discrimination law and has championed the cause of women's rights. As the 
author of one of the first texts on women and the law, she brings a sophisti-
cated understanding of gender issues to her analysis. 183 
Presidents Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama, as well as 
Governors Perpich (Minnesota), Brown (California), and Pawlenty (Minne-
sota) have made creating a gender-diverse judiciary a priority as executives. 
But even now, as women make up nearly half of all law school graduates, 
governors in Oregon and South Dakota, or nominating commissions in New 
York, submit slates of candidates for judicial positions that include no 
women. This Article's examination of concepts in gender theory, such as 
the myth that women have already achieved equality or are making great 
progress, the qualified labor pool, disparate impact, the pipeline, the pyra-
mid, tokenism, and backlash, demonstrate that only by continued vigilance 
and organized pressure will women succeed in creating, and maintaining, a 
gender-equal judiciary or a gender-equal executive branch. Progress is nei-
ther inevitable nor irreversible. We need to understand how women can win 
executive and judicial positions, and also how we succeed in getting execu-
tives to use their positions to expand the numbers of women in public office 
more generally. Only by first rejecting the proposition that women's pro-
gress is natural, inevitable, irreversible, and a necessary result of women's 
183. The work of more than seventy scholars in the Collaborative Research Network 
on Gender and Judging of the Law and Society Association shows the rich possibilities of a 
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representation in the legal profession can we begin the discussion of what 
would generate progress. We can learn from this history of women's 
movement from 0% to 25%. But while we may want to replicate efforts that 
have produced success in the past, gender theory-particularly the concepts 
of discrimination, devaluation, and backlash-can help us design and mobi-
lize for a new campaign to move us from minority to parity. 
